ssh -- OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
     ssh [-1246AaCfgkMNnqsTtVvXxY]                        [user@]hostname [command]
                                     [-b bind_address] 
                                     [-c cipher_spec] 
                                     [-D [bind_address:]port] 
                                     [-e escape_char] 
                                     [-F configfile]
                                     [-i identity_file]
                                     [-l login_name] 
                                     [-m mac_spec] 
                                     [-O ctl_cmd] 
                                     [-o option] 
                                     [-p port] 
                                     [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport]
                                     [-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] 
                                     [-S ctl_path]
                                     [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] 
used to logon to a remote host and for executing commands. Replaces rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP ports can be forwarded over the secure channel.

When the user's identity has been validated ssh executes command or logs on and presents a shell prompt. All communication is encrypted.

The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.

If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the user may use the escape characters to control the connection.

If a pseudo-terminal has not been allocated(-T) , the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the escape character to none will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used.

ESCAPE CHARACTERS

default escape is ~ .
   ~~ transmit ~
   ~. Disconnect.
   ~^Z Background ssh.
   ~# List forwarded connections.
   ~& Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate.
   ~? Display a list of escape characters.
   ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it).
   ~C Open command line. allows the addition of port forwardings using -L and -R , the cancellation of existing remote port-forwardings using -KR[bind_address:]port.
!command allows executetion of a command at the local host if PermitLocalCommand is enabled in ssh_config.
Basic help is available, using the -h option.

The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line and be follow a newline to be interpreted as special.
The escape character can be changed in configuration files with the EscapeChar or on the command line with -e .

-e escape_char (default: ~). Setting the character to none disables escapes and makes the session fully transparent.

-l login_name to use on the remote host, may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.

-F configfile Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If given on the command line, the system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh_config) will be ignored.
The default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config.

-v Verbose mode. display debugging messages . Helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. maximum is 3 i.e. ssh -v -v -v .

~R Request rekeying of the connection (only version 2 if the peer supports it).

-A Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.

-a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.

-b bind_address Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address.

-C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, ,stdout, stderr, and data for forwarded X11 and TCP connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by gzip(1), and the level can be controlled by the CompressionLevel option for protocol version 1. Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be set on a host‑by‑host basis in the configuration files; see the Compression option.

-c cipher_spec Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.

-D [bind_address:]port Specifies a local dynamic application-level port forwarding. Only root can forward privileged ports. This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Connections to this port are forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act as a SOCKS server.
Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.

IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax: [bind_address/]port or by enclosing the address in square brackets.
Only the root can forward privileged ports.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. An explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.

-g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.

-f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution.
Useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. implies -n. The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm.

-I smartcard_device used for storing the user's private RSA key. Only available if support for smartcard devices is compiled in (default is no support).

-i identity_file Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for RSA or DSA authentication is read. default ~/.ssh/identity for protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_rsa and ~/.ssh/id_dsa for protocol version 2.
May be specified on a perhost basis in the configuration file.
Multiple -i options (and multiple identities specified in configuration files) is permitted.

-k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server.

-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport Port on the local (client) host is to be forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to host port hostport from the remote machine. Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax: [bind_address/]port/host/hostport or by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.

-M Places the ssh client into master mode for connection sharing.
Multiple -M options places ssh into master mode with confirmation required before slave connections are accepted. Refer to ControlMaster in ssh_config(5)

-m mac_spec for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms can be specified in order of preference. See the MACs keyword for more information.

-N Do not execute a remote command. for just forwarding ports (protocol version 2 only).

-n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (i.e., prevents reading from stdin). must be used when ssh is run in the background.
Use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh program will be put in the background. Does not work if password is needed; see -f

-O ctl_cmd Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: check (check that the master process is running) and exit (request the master to exit).

-o option provide options in the format used in the configuration file. useful for specifying options for which there is no command-line flag, see ssh_config(5).
AddressFamily
BatchMode
BindAddress
ChallengeResponseAuthentication 
CheckHostIP
Cipher
Ciphers
ClearAllForwardings
Compression
CompressionLevel
ConnectionAttempts
ConnectTimeout
ControlMaster
ControlPath
DynamicForward
EscapeChar
ExitOnForwardFailure
ForwardAgent
ForwardX11
ForwardX11Trusted
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials 
GatewayPorts
GlobalKnownHostsFile
GSSAPIAuthentication
HashKnownHosts
Host
HostbasedAuthentication
HostKeyAlgorithms
HostKeyAlias
HostName
IdentityFile
IdentitiesOnly
KbdInteractiveDevices
LocalCommand
LocalForward
LogLevel
MACs
NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost 
NumberOfPasswordPrompts
PasswordAuthentication
PermitLocalCommand
Port
PreferredAuthentications
Protocol
ProxyCommand
PubkeyAuthentication
RekeyLimit
RemoteForward
RhostsRSAAuthentication
RSAAuthentication
SendEnv
ServerAliveInterval
ServerAliveCountMax
SmartcardDevice
StrictHostKeyChecking
TCPKeepAlive
Tunnel
TunnelDevice
UsePrivilegedPort
User
UserKnownHostsFile
VerifyHostKeyDNS
XAuthLocation

-p port Can be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.

-1 tries protocol version 1 only.
-2 version 2 only.
-4 use IPv4 addresses only.
-6 use IPv6 addresses only.
-q Quiet (IMHO not a good idea). Warnings and diagnostics are suppressed.

-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to be forwarded to the given host and port on the local side.
Works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the remote side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, it is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to host port hostport from the local machine.

Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square braces or using an alternative syntax: [bind_address/]host/port/hostport.

By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to the loopback interface only. This may be overriden by specifying a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address `*', indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see sshd_config(5)).

-S ctl_path location of a control socket for connection sharing. Refer to ControlPath and ControlMaster in ssh_config(5)

-s requests invocation of a subsystem on the remote system. Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which facilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg. sftp(1)). The subsystem is specified as the remote command.

-T Disable pseudo-tty allocation.
-t Force pseudo-tty allocation, allows execution of screen-based programs on a remote host, which can be , e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple -t options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty.

-V Display the version number and exit.

-w local_tun[:remote_tun ] Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4) devices between the client (local_tun) and the server (remote_tun).

The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword any, which uses the next available tunnel device. If remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to any. See also the Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5). If the Tunnel directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode, which is point-to-point.

-X Enables X11 forwarding. can be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.

X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.

For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension restrictions by default. refer to -Y and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for more information.
-x Disables X11 forwarding.

-Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls.
ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5).

ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an error occurred.

AUTHENTICATION

The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2.
Protocol 2 is the default, with ssh falling back to protocol 1 if it detects protocol 2 is unsupported. These settings may be altered using the Protocol option in ssh_config(5), or enforced using the -1 and -2 options (see above). Both protocols support similar authentication methods, but protocol 2 is preferred since it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality (the traffic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour) and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, hmac-ripemd160). Protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the connection.

The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authentication, host‑based authentication, public key authentication, challenge‑ response authentication, and password authentication.
Authentication methods are tried in that order, protocol 2 has a configuration option to change the default order.

Preferred Authentications

ssh maintains and checks a database containing identification for all hosts it has been used with, in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory.
Additionally, the file /etc/ssh_known_hosts is checked for known hosts. New hosts are added to the user's file.
If a host's identification differs from the previous one, ssh warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks, which could be used to circumvent the encryption. StrictHostKeyChecking controls logins to machines whose host key is not known or has changed.

TCP FORWARDING

Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One application is a secure connection to a mail server; another is going through firewalls.

In the example below for encrypting communication between an IRC client and server, where the IRC server does not directly support encrypted communications. The user connects to the remote host using ssh, specifying a port to be used to forward connections to the remote server. Then starts the service which is to be encrypted on the client machine, connecting to the same local port, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection.

The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine 127.0.0.1 (localhost) to remote server server.example.com

 $ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
         $ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1

This tunnels a connection to IRC server server.example.com, joining channel #users, nickname pinky, using port 1234. It doesn't matter which port is used, as long as it's greater than 1023 ( only root can open sockets on privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with any ports already in use.
The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the remote server, the standard port for IRC services.

-f backgrounds ssh and the remote command sleep 10 is specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to start the service which is to be tunnelled. If no connections are made within the time specified, ssh will exit.

X11 FORWARDING

If the ForwardX11 variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description of the -X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made from the local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY. Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in configuration files.

The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because ssh creates a ``proxy'' X server on the server machine for forwarding the connections over the encrypted channel.

ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine. For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).

If the ForwardAgent variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description of the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the remote side.

VERIFYING HOST KEYS

When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user (unless StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints are determined using ssh-keygen(1):
      $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key

If the fingerprint is known, it is matched and the key is accepted.
If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. A resource record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented.

 ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.

The displayed lines must be added to the zonefile. To verify that the zone is answering fingerprint queries:

 dig -t SSHFP host.example.com

the client connects:

   ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
           [...]
           Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
           Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?

See VerifyHostKeyDNS in ssh_config(5)

SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS

ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined securely. The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic).

The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it.

On the client:

 # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
           # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
           # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2 
On the server:
 # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
           # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1 
Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option. The following entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user ``jane'' and on tun device 2 from user ``john'', if PermitRootLogin is set to ``forced-commands-only'':

tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john

Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and isakmpd(8).

ENVIRONMENT variables

DISPLAY indicates the location of the X11 server. It is automatically set by ssh to point to a value of the form hostname:n , where hostname indicates the host where the shell runs, and n is an integer > 0. ssh uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure channel. The user should normally not set DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to manually copy any required authorization cookies).
HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory.
LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with systems that use this variable.
MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when compiling ssh.
SSH_ASKPASS If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling ssh from a .xsession or related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null to make this work.)
SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with the agent.
SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the connection. The variable contains four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number, server IP address, and server port number.
SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if a forced command is executed. It can be used to extract the original arguments.
SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated with the current shell or command. If the current session has no tty, this variable is not set.
TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new connections).
USER Set to the name of the user logging in.
ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format VARNAME=value to the environment if users are allowed to change their environment. Sethe PermitUserEnvironment in sshd_config(5).

FILES

~/.rhosts used for host‑based authentication. This file needs to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8) reads it as root. owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for group or world.

~/.shosts used as .rhosts which allows host‑based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh.

~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) for this user. The format of this file is described in the sshd(8) manual page. This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.

~/.ssh/config per-user configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). permissions: read/write for the user, and not accessible by others( 600 ).

~/.ssh/environment Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see ENVIRONMENT

~/.ssh/identity
~/.ssh/id_dsa
~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not accessible by others (read/write/execute). ssh will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using 3DES.

~/.ssh/identity.pub
~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.

~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file.

~/.ssh/rc Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See sshd(8)

/etc/hosts.equiv for host‑based authentication (see above). It should only be writable by root.

/etc/shosts.equiv used like hosts.equiv, but allows host‑based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh.

/etc/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file from darwin Mac OS X
Notice all lines are commented out.
/etc/ssh_config.system_default differes only in the 2 commented out lines:
# GSSAPIAuthentication no
# GSSAPIKeyExchange no

  
  #   $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.19 2003/08/13 08:46:31 markus Exp $
  
  # This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file.  
  # This file provides defaults for users, and 
  # the values can be changed in per-user configuration files or on the command line.
  
  # Configuration data is parsed as follows:
  #  1. command line options
  #  2. user-specific file
  #  3. system-wide file
  # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
  # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
  # configuration file, and defaults at the end.
  
  # Site-wide defaults for various options
  
  # Host *
  #   ForwardAgent no
  #   ForwardX11 no
  #   RhostsRSAAuthentication no
  #   RSAAuthentication yes
  #   PasswordAuthentication yes
  #   HostbasedAuthentication no
  #   GSSAPIAuthentication yes
  #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
  #   GSSAPIKeyExchange yes
  #   GSSAPITrustDNS no
  #   BatchMode no
  #   CheckHostIP yes
  #   AddressFamily any
  #   ConnectTimeout 0
  #   StrictHostKeyChecking ask
  #   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
  #   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
  #   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
  #   Port 22
  #   Protocol 2,1
  #   Cipher 3des
  #   Ciphers aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc
  #   EscapeChar ~
  #   Tunnel no
  #   TunnelDevice any:any
  #   PermitLocalCommand no
  
  

/etc/ssh_host_key
/etc/ssh_host_dsa_key
/etc/ssh_host_rsa_key contain the private parts of the host keys and are used for host‑based authentication. If protocol version 1 is used, ssh must be setuid root, since the host key is readable only by root. For protocol version 2, ssh uses ssh-keysign(8) to access the host keys, eliminating the requirement that ssh be setuid root when host‑based authentication is used. By default ssh is not setuid root.

/etc/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable. See sshd(8)

/etc/sshrc Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the sshd(8)

SEE scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1), tun(4), hosts.equiv(5), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8)

The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers, RFC 4250, 2006.
The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture, RFC 4251, 2006.
The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol, RFC 4252, 2006.
The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4253, 2006.
The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC 4254, 2006.
Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, 2006.
Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), RFC 4256, 2006.
The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension, RFC 4335, 2006.
The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, 2006.
Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4345, 2006.
Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, 2006.

AUTHORS

OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.